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cargo damage distinction remains viable. The Fourth Circuit also
rejected the district court's reliance on legislative intent as justification for its holding. The Fourth Circuit found that the language of
the Ship Mortgage Act plainly grants tort liens priority without exception; and that in view of such clear statutory language, an intent
of Congress to subordinate cargo claims is immaterial."
The basis of the Fourth Circuit's Oriente decision was case precedent47 which has interpreted the language of the Ship Mortgage Act
to allow cargo claims in tort. The district court, in contrast, focused
on the policy of lien priority law and the legislative intent behind the
Ship Mortgage Act. The district court attempted to distinguish
Oriente from case precedent on the basis of the cargo claim and prepaid freight distinction," while the Fourth Circuit emphasized the
general language in cases allowing claims in tort." This mutually
exclusive dichotomy has attracted the attention of leading commentators who have split over the question of which approach is preferable."5 Although the district court's policy approach is more equitable,
the language of the Ship Mortgage Act does not indicate that cargo
claims should occupy a subordinate position even when brought in
tort. The Oriente decision, while a boon to shippers, effectively relegates repairmen and suppliers to a priority position beneath cargo
claimants, and puts the mortgagee in a position less desirable than
Congress intended.
MARK

II.

T.

COBERLY

CIVIL PROCEDURE*

A. Nonparty Protective Order Not Appealable as Final
Disposition of Rights
Historically, within the federal system, appellate review of trial
court orders has been afforded only when those orders could be char529 F.2d at 233.
"Id.

See note 22 supra.
374 F. Supp. at 31.
529 F.2d at 222-23.
Compare 7A MooRE, supra note 1, at I C.06 and GILMORE & BLACK, supra note
6, at 741, with Richards, Maritime Liens In Tort, GeneralAverage, and Salvage, 47
TUL. L. lav. 569, 581 (1973).
'

"

* The Law Review acknowledges the contribution of research by Robin M. Blackburn, a student at the Washington & Lee School of Law.
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acterized as final.' Finality, however, is in some respects an illusory
classification since almost any order of a court contains some element
of finality.' The Supreme Court has stated quite broadly that appellate review should not halt the "orderly process" of trial court adjudication.' In certain instances, however, the Court has afforded some
review during litigation.4 North CarolinaAssociation of Black Law5
confronted the
yers v. North Carolina Board of Law Examiners
Fourth Circuit with the issue of whether a nonparty witness could
obtain appellate review of a federal district court's denial of a discovery protective order even though such an order is not a final judgment.'
In Black Lawyers, the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers (NCABL) brought a class action suit 7 against the North Carolina
Board of Law Examiners (Examiners) alleging that the annual bar
admittance examination prepared and administered by the Examiners was arbitrary, unfair, and racially discriminatory.' Twenty-nine
black law graduates who were denied admittance to the state bar
because of their failure on the allegedly discriminatory examination
joined the NCABL in this class action suit The Examiners denied
Andrew v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963); Cobbledick v. United States,'309
U.S. 323 (1940). The doctrine of finality was first declared in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, §§ 21-22, 25, 1 Stat. 73. The doctrine is presently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970), which provides in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. . . ." See generally
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 101 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT]; P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SsAPIRo & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, ch. 11 (2d ed. 1973); Crick,
The FinalJudgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940), citing Segurola v. United
States, 275 U.S. 106, 112 (1927).
1 See text accompanying notes 32-53 infra.
538 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1976).
' See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Louie v. Carnevale,
443 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971).

1 The class action suit was pleaded under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The proposed class
included the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, the twenty-nine black
applicants who had failed the bar admittance examination, and all prior and future
black applicants who failed or will fail the allegedly discriminatory examination. 538
F.2d at 548.
538 F.2d at 548.
Id. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1), the district court has the responsibility of
determining whether the action is suitable for class action litigation. The court's ability to fix the scope of the class represented in the action was suggested by the Fourth
Circuit as a possible solution to the discovery objection raised in Black Lawyers. See
text accompanying note 25-31 infra. By limiting the size of the class, the volume of
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these allegations and additionally alleged that the failure of the specifiea black applicants was caused by their poor scholastic standing
and deficiencies in their legal education."0 In order to establish these
deficiencies, the Examiners sought extensive discovery from North
Carolina Central University Law School (NCCU) and its faculty
where twenty-seven of the twenty-nine law graduates had received
their legal education." When the trial judg6 refused to issue a protective order enjoining further allegedly burdensome discovery, 2 NCCU
appealed3 to the Fourth Circuit for review of the adverse ruling on its

motion. '

The Fourth Circuit held that the refusal of a motion for a protective ban on discovery was not appealable.' 4 The court based this
holding on an application of the collateral order rule announced in
Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp.'5 In Cohen, a federal district court entered a preliminary order that a state statute requiring
substantial security in stockholders derivative actions was not applicable in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction.' On appeal
of this order,' 7 the Supreme Court set out three conditions necessary
before an appellate court may review such an order. First, the order
discovery sought by the Examiners presumably could be lessened. 538 F.2d at 549.
, 538 F.2d at 548.
Id.
22 NCCU was denied the protective order provided for in FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c),
and 45 (b) and (d). Rule 26 (c) provides: "Upon motion. . .by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending
. . .may make any order which justice requires to protect a. . .person from annoyance, embarassment, oppression or undue burden or expense ...
" Rule 45 (b) and
(d) establish that subpoenas for the production of documentary evidence and for taking
depositions are subject to the provisions of Rule 26 (c).
'3 538 F.2d at 548.
" The statutory sections cited by the Fourth Circuit were 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292
(1970). 538 F.2d at 548. See note 1 supra.28 U.S.C. § 1292 provides for appellate review
of certain interlocutory orders of district courts. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 1,
at § 102. The NCCU appeal did not qualify under any of the specific situations warranting appeal under § 1292 (a). The absence of the necessary certification of the
district judge prohibited interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1970). See
text accompanying notes 32-35 infra.
" 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
, Id. at 545. The Supreme Court reasoned that the district court's order was a
final decision on the applicability of the state statute. The opinion continued that since
this order did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case it
was not interlocutory in nature. Id. at 546.
11The Third Circuit reversed the trial court's order and held that the state statute
requiring security in stockholder derivative actions was applicable to diversity actions
in federal courts. Id.
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must be a final disposition of a claimed right." Second, the issue
raised by the order must be severable from the underlying cause of
action. 19 Finally, the issue must raise an important and unsettled
question of law which should not be deferred for appellate consideration until the whole case is adjudicated."
In Black Lawyers, the Fourth Circuit found that the district order
failed to meet the final two requirements.2" NCCU's status as a nonparty to the original litigation did not make its objection to the order
collateral to the underlying suit. Rather, the discovery sought by the
Examiners formed an integral part of the action." The court also
I" Id. at 546-47. In Cohen, the corporate right to indemnity before prosecution was
the claimed right. Id. at 545.
" Id. at 546.
Id. The evolution of the Cohen doctrine reached the sharpest departure from
notions of finality in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964). There,
in a suit for wrongful death, the district court had stricken all parts of the complaint
pleading for recovery by the decedent's brothers and sisters. Id. at 150-51. Although
these plaintiffs had a right to appeal upon completion of the suit brought by the
remaining plaintiff, the Supreme Court declared that the doctrine of finality must be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. Id. at 152, citing Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Court looked to the practical result of a second drawn-out trial if the order was on later appeal found to be
erroneous. Appeal was therefore allowed under what the Court itself termed a marginal
circumstance. 379 U.S. at 154. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 101 at 511; Carrington,
The Power of DistrictJudges and the Responsibility of Courtsof Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv.
507, 515 (1969); Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TExAS L. REv. 292,
305 (1966).
21 538 F.2d at 548.
2

Id.

Id. The court relied on three principal cases to establish the non-appealability
of an intermediate procedural question when the question could not be resolved independently of the substance of the litigation. In Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843 (3d
Cir. 1969), the defendant in the action refused to answer a question at deposition
because he challenged the relevance of the inquiry. He alleged that his status as a nonparty to the third party complaint which engendered the discovery made his appeal
of the discovery order collateral and therefore immediately appealable. Id. at 845. The
Third Circuit refused review, holding that the relevance of discovery necessarily entails
consideration of the substance of the litigation and cannot be considered as a collateral
issue. Id. at 846. The second case considered by the Fourth Circuit was United States
v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971). In Ryan, the court of appeals granted an appeal of a
discovery order which required the production of books, records, and documents located in Kenya. The order provided that since the material was located in Kenya and
was subject to Kenyan law forbidding removal of such records without governmental
approval, the respondent need only apply for approval to remove the materials. If
approval was denied, submission to discovery was to take place in Kenya. Id. at 531.
The Supreme Court held that such an order was not appealable since an adequate
appeal would be afforded based on a contempt citation for refusal to apply for approval
or to produce the material in Kenya. Id. at 533. Finally, in Ryan v. Commissioner, 517
2
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found that the issue of the appealability of a district court's protective order was not an unsettled question of law; instead, prior case
law had uniformly established that such orders were unappealable.?
Because NCCU failed to establish the requirements for appealability
as a collateral order, the Fourth Circuit found this order concerning
the scope and conduct of discovery within the discretionary powers
of the district court.?
The Fourth Circuit, however, recognized the difficult situation in
which NCCU was placed.? As a nonparty witness, NCCU could either submit to what it considered unduly burdensome discovery, or
ignore the trial court's order and face a possible contempt citation.
A contempt citation, uniformly recognized as a final judgment,"8 affords what the Supreme Court has termed "adequate" means of appeal.? Realistically, however, this appeal is often an ineffectual remedy given the general framework of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide for a broad scope of discovery.28 Broad discovery
coupled with the moving party's burden of showing good cause for the
issuance of a protective ordern has produced a marked hesitation on
the part of federal courts to accept a claim of inconvenience as cause
for preventing discovery." Given this theoretically "adequate" yet
F.2d 13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975), a nonparty witness refused to
answer interrogatories on grounds that the inquiry was irrelevant. The Seventh Circuit
held that since the relevance of the information could be resolved by reference to the
substantive litigation, the collateral order rule announced in Cohen was inapplicable.
Id. at 17.
24 538 F.2d at 549.
2 Id.
21 Any contempt citation, whether civil or criminal, is considered to be an appealable final judgment for a nonparty. Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).
A distinction is made, however, for parties to the litigation where only criminal contempt affords immediate appellate review. Fenton v. Walling, 139 F.2d 608, 609 (9th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 798 (1944); see generally 9 MooRE's FEDERAL Pncar cE
110.13 [4], at 164-66 (2d ed. 1976). The difference between the two types of contempt citations is not always clear, as some courts have manipulated the labels by
imposing a fine or otherwise identifying contempt of a discovery order as criminal,
thereby allowing appeal. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947); Hanley v. James
McHugh Const. Co., 419 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1969); Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern
Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964).
2 Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).
2 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c). See note 12 supra.
31 White v. Wirtz, 402 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Pardome,
30 F.R.D. 338, 341 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Kamin v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 22 F.R.D.
220 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Morrison Export Co. v. Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477,479 (W.D. Mo. 1950); United
States ex rel. Edelstein v Brussell Sewing Mach. Co., 3 F.R.D. 87,88 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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practically unacceptable requisite for review, future challenges to
discovery orders by nonparty witnesses should not only explore alternative methods of testing such orders, 31 but should also raise justifications for opposing the discovery which are stronger than mere inconvenience.
Alternative methods to a Cohen collateral order method of gaining
appellate review of discovery orders have been recognized although
none have been uniformly successful. As discovery orders are interlocutory in nature, they may be appealable under the Interlocutory
Appeals Act of 1958.3 The Act permits an appeal when the district
judge and the court of appeals find that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
'
materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation."
Although the trial judge in Black Lawyers indicated a substantial
interest in the propriety of his order by suspending enforcement until
the appeal of NCCU was heard,3 the Fourth Circuit's classification
of the order as an "intermediate procedural question" seemingly removed this protective35order from review under the discretionary provisions of § 1292 (b).
Another method of obtaining review which has been used with
increasing frequency, although not exclusively for interlocutory appeals, is the petition for writ of mandamus. 3 Traditionally, use of
mandamus has been limited to "clear and indisputable"37 situations
where appeal is an inadequate remedy8 and where the writ is necessary to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. 39 Courts denying writs
of mandamus in discovery disputes typically have observed that the
issues raised could be subsequently treated on appeal with no irreparable harm suffered as a result of the delay.4" Under this traditional
3, See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAv. L. REv. 940, 995-1000 (1961).
3128 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1970).
3

Id.

538 F.2d at 548.
SId.
110.26, at 283-84 (2d ed. 1976); Note,
' See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 HARv. L. REv. 595
31

(1973).

11Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953), citing United
States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899).
3 Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).
31Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,
319 U.S. 21 (1943); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 387 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1961).
11Cmax v. Hall, 290 F.2d 736, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1961); Byram Concretanks, Inc. v.
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standard for the issuance of writs of mandamus, the Supreme Court's
declaration of the adequacy of an appeal following a contempt citation' would seem to remove the NCCU order from eligibility for a
writ.
Within the past twenty years, however, the Supreme Court has
extended to the courts of appeals the discretionary power to issue
writs of mandamus in "exceptional" circumstances to insure the proper judicial administration of the federal court system." In the leading case of Schlagenhauf v. Holder,43 a trial judge ordered a party to
undergo physical and mental examinations under Rule 35 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without affording a hearing prior to
issuing the order." The Court found that this controversy, involving
the first challenge15 to the district courts' power under Rule 35 (a),
constituted an issue that demanded appellate supervisory control
through a writ of mandamus." Schlagenhauf held that where there
is a substantial allegation of "usurpation of power" by a district judge
on an issue of first impression affecting future federal judicial administration, the courts of appeal have the power to resolve the issue
through the issuance of a writ of mandamus.47 The Fourth Circuit has
exercised this supervisory mandamus power when a district court has
ignored the court of appeal's precedental holding as to governmental
privilege.4"
Meaney, 286 F.2d 170, 171 (3d Cir. 1961) (per curiam); Fisher v. Delehant, 250 F.2d
265, 268 (8th Cir. 1957); National Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595, 598
(4th Cir. 1938).
" See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
12 LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). In LaBuy, a district court
judge ordered that a difficult case be heard by a master because of the district court's
congested calendar. The Seventh Circuit, however, issued a writ of mandamus directing the judge to hear the complex litigation himself. The Supreme Court held that the
writ was properly issued under the circumstances of the district judge's order. Although most antitrust litigation is complex, complexity alone does not justify denial
of a trial before a court. Id. at 259. The Court held that the court of appeals' writ of
mandamus was properly directed to effect appellate supervision of the federal court
system. Id. at 259-60. The use of masters under FED. R. Civ. P. 53 was held "to aid
judges in the performance of specific judicial duties" and not to displace the court.
352 U.S. at 256, citing Ex parte Peterson, 252 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
43 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
" Id. at 108-09.
Id. at 110.
" The Seventh Circuit refused to issue the writ. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the supervisory mandamus issue. Id. at 109.
17 Id. at 111.
1' In United States v. Hemphill, 369 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1966), the court issued a
supervisory writ of mandamus where the district judge's order was subject to a sub-
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In a recent case, United States Parole Board v. Merhige,49 the
Fourth Circuit firmly established that it no longer viewed mandamus
as confined to the traditional role of appellate correction of clear error
going to the question of jurisdiction or power of the lower courts. 0 The
Merhige Court issued a writ of mandamus to prevent depositions and
interrogatories where the discovery would effect a disruptive and
unwarranted intrusion upon the records of the Board of Parole." The
court held that this supervisory mandamus would shape future discovery procedures throughout the circuit.5 Efforts to rely on
Schlagenhauf to support appellate review of discovery rulings for the
purpose of providing a uniform application of discretionary discovery
decisions within each circuit have been unavailing, however.53 This
restriction of the supervisory mandamus role of the courts of appeal
negates the effectiveness of such a measure in the Black Lawyers
discretionary discovery order context.
Since the alternative methods of procuring appellate review do
not appear to increase appreciably the likelihood of successful appeal
in a Black Lawyers situation, transforming objections to the discovery order from a claim of undue burden to one of privilege might offer
a nonparty witness the only avenue for review of the discovery order
without a contempt citation. In Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil
stantial allegation of usurpation of power. There, the district judge ordered the Secretary of Labor, a nonparty to the suit, to disclose the names of all witnesses with
information regarding the issues of the controversy. The Fourth Circuit found this
order clearly erroneous in light of the qualified privileges established in Wirtz v. B.A.C.
Steel Prods., Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962), that the government could withhold the
names and statements of informants.
11487 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1973).
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
S2

Id.

5 See Beal v. Schul, 383 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (Seitz, J., dissenting); 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.83 [9.-31, at 622 (2d ed. 1976). But see Winters
v. Travia, 495 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam). In Winters, the Second Circuit
held that a district judge's order under FED. R. Civ. P. 35 for physical and mental
examination, when no claim of physical or mental disability formed the basis of the
plaintiff's claim, constituted an abuse of discretion and issued a writ of mandamus to
compel further proceedings in the district court without requiring the plaintiff's submission to examination. 495 F.2d at 840-41. The plaintiff opposed such examination
on religious grounds, since, as a practicing Christian Scientist, she would not submit
to any form of medication. Id. at 840; U.S. CONST. amend. I. Judge Mansfield, in his
concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that this use of mandamus was improper
because the district judge's order was well within his discretionary powers. 495 F.2d
at 842 (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting).

1977]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Co.,54 a nonparty witness' special right in the material ordered discoverable facilitated immediate appellate review. 5 The Tenth Circuit in
Covey Oil held that nonparty witnesses should not be required to
submit to a contempt citation in order to obtain a determination of
their claimed rights of trade secrets. The distinction between an
assertion of merely burdensome discovery and of discovery that entails disclosure of a trade secret, is that affirmative rights demand
immediate review because submission to discovery could produce
irreparable harm to the witness.57 The Covey Oil court held that an
affirmative right can remove the appealability issue from the traditional approach that the review following a contempt citation provides adequate recourse for appeal.58 Under this analysis, the claim
of irreparable injury by a third party witness must still be balanced
against the parties' need for information during preparation for litigation."
Importantly, similar immediate review has been afforded when
privileged government employment records, 5 government accident
investigation reports with national security implications,' and grand
jury transcripts62 have been made available through discovery orders
despite governmental objections. 3 In Black Lawyers, an assertion
that the discovery sought from the state university was privileged 4
might have provided the Fourth Circuit with justification for reviewing the district judge's denial of the protective order. Similarly, the
entire objection to the order might have been averted if, due to the
51340

F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965). In Black Lawyers,

the Fourth Circuit accepted the disposition of Covey Oil as correct on its facts. 538
F.2d at 549.
340 F.2d at 996.
" Id. at 996-97.
5' Id. at 999.
" Id. at 996.
5 Id. at 999.
" Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000
(1970).
"

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).

,3United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).

Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967) offers a limitation on the power of an
appellate court to exercise its power of supervisory mandamus. There, the Supreme
Court held that a right to an immediate appeal based on a government claim of
immunity\under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must be balanced against
the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal proceeding to a just and speedy
trial. Id. at 98; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" Any assertion of governmental immunity must be formally claimed and lodged
by the head of the governmental department which has control over the matter. United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
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privileged status of the discovery material sought, the district judge's
order entailed only an in camera review of the materials.
In the recent case of Kerr v. United States District Court," the
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's denial of mandamus"
where a proper assertion of governmental privilege was not made to
oppose discovery of prisoners' state correctional files. 7 The Court
held that since in camera review was a highly appropriate and useful
means of dealing with claims of governmental immunity, failure to
request this convenient review by the district court makes the extraordinary writ of mandamus unavailable." NCCU's appeal for review or mandamus in Black Lawyers might have been allowed, therefore, if NCCU asserted governmental immunity or privilege and the
district judge denied any restrictive in camera review.
The Fourth Circuit opinion in Black Lawyers represents a strict
application of the final decision requirement which prevents discovery orders from becoming immediately appealable. This requirement
is designed to eliminate delay and promote the efficient handling of
cases." The right of appeal gives the appellant an instrument for
delay which must be weighed against the great value placed on efficient judicial administration. 70 When discovery is opposed, as it was
in Black Lawyers, solely because it is burdensome or inconvenient,
the nonparty appellant has no claim of irreparable harm justifying
delay of litigation by appellate review of a trial judge's interlocutory
order. Such an appeal could only serve to threaten the right of litigants to a speedy determination of the merits of the controversy, and
might inundate courts with unwarranted appeals. A policy which
allows appeals only after a contempt citation is one effective way of
minimizing appeals and screening frivolous claims. Black Lawyers
thereby utilizes the principle of finality to distribute important discretionary discovery authority to the district courts within the federal
judicial hierarchy.71
B. Abstention Doctrine: Federal Judicial Intervention
Appropriate In Case Alleging Bad Faith and Harassment
While North CarolinaAssociation of Black Lawyers v. North Car96 S. Ct. 2119 (1976).
Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., 511 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1975).
96 S. Ct. at 2126.
Id. at 2125.
Id. at 2124.
4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.83 [11], at 26-632 (2d ed. 1976).
7 See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 330 (1940).

"
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olina Board of Law Examiners' defined the division of powers within
the federal judicial system, the Fourth Circuit in Timmerman v.
Brown2 addressed the issue of the federal judicial role vis-a-vis state
judicial functions. In Timmerman, two prisoners at the Central
Correctional Institute in Columbia, South Carolina instituted a class
action suit 3 against State Magistrate Franchot A. Brown, State Solicitor John Foard, and State Department of Corrections Director William Leek alleging violations of the prisoners' first and
fourteenth
5
amendment rights4 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
The complaint, seeking equitable and declaratory relief in addition to damages from the named defendants, 6 alleged that certain
unnamed correctional officers, without justification,' brutally beat
1 538 F.2d 547

(4th Cir. 1976).
528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975).
The plaintiffs sought to represent the class of all inmates who are, have been or
will be incarcerated in the Central Correctional Institute. Id. at 812 n.1.
I Id. at 815. The alleged violations included bad faith prosecutions of the plaintiffs
and suppression of the prosecution of the correctional officials. These allegations asserted a breach of the plaintiffs' right "to petition the Government for redress of
grievances", and to due process and equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend.
I & XIV.
528 F.2d at 813. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) complements § 1983 by making unlawful the conspiracy of two
or more people to: (a) prevent an officer of the United States from performing his
duties; (b) obstruct justice by intimidating a party, witness or juror; or (c) deprive
persons of rights or privileges under the laws. This section also provides that the party
injured by such conspiracy may have an action in damages against one or more of the
conspirators.
The plaintiffs sought money damages, a declaration that Solicitor Foard's suppression of the criminal warrants which were based on probable cause violated the
plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment right, and an injunction against all defendants, except Magistrate Brown, restraining them from interference in the criminal warrant
issuance process. Further, the plaintiffs requested an injunction to restrain the pending
criminal prosecutions and a writ of mandamus requiring Magistrate Brown to issue
criminal warrants against Timmerman's attackers. 528 F.2d at 813.
1 Timmerman was lccused of being under the influence of alcohol at the time the
attack occurred. The Fourth Circuit accepted as fact the plaintiffs' allegations that
this accusation was untrue. Id. at 812. The reason for such an assumption was
grounded on the district court's finding that the plaintiffs failed to "state a claim upon
which relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Since the defendants' motion
2
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plaintiff Timmerman. After plaintiff Thomas stopped the beating,
the correctional officials denied Timmerman medical treatment.,
Defendants Brown and Foard, although fully informed of these facts
and aware of the plaintiffs' desire to bring criminal charges against
the officers, condoned the transfer of Timmerman and Thomas to
solitary confinement where they remained as of the date of the
Timmerman decision.' 0 Despite this incarceration, the plaintiffs were
able to have delivered to Magistrate Brown application for criminal
warrants alleging assault and battery which Brown determined
averred probable cause justifying the issuance of warrants." Solicitor
Foard, however, intervened in the warrant process and prevented the
issuance of these warrants on the grounds that criminal warrants
could be. issued against correctional officials only upon his determination of probable cause based on an independent investigation by the
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division.'2 The plaintiffs also alleged that they were currently subject to bad faith criminal charges
arising from this same beating.'3 Although Magistrate Brown dismissed these charges, Solicitor Foard caused the county grand jury
to indict the plaintiffs on substantially the same charges."
The district court dismissed the complaint against Magistrate
Brown and Solicitor Foard on grounds that they were immune from
suit since the actions complained of concerned the exercise of their
respective judicial and quasi-judicial functions.' 5 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit decided two important issues raised by the appellants.'6 First, the court held that judicial and quasi-judicial immunity
extends only to money damages and not to the equitable and declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffs.'7 Second, based on arguments
for dismissal asserted judicial immunity, the Fourth Circuit, proceeding under FED.
R. Civ. P. 56, gave the plaintiffs, as the party opposing the motion, the benefit of all
reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuine issue as to any material fact
existed. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See C. WRmHT,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 99 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
528 F.2d at 812.
'Id.
Id. at 813.
Id.
22 The intervention by Solicitor Foard in the criminal warrant issuance process
was illegal under South Carolina law. Id. at 813 n.2. See S.C. CODE § 16-105 (1962).
11528 F.2d at 813.
I
Id.
Id. at 812.
, The district court certified the dismissal of defendants Brown and Foard as a
final judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (b) finding no just reason for delaying the
appeal of this order. 528 F.2d at 812.
17 Id.
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raised by defendants Brown and Foard that the pending state prosecution barred federal judicial intervention, the court concluded'8 that
the plaintiffs' federal cause of action qualified as an exception to the
restrictive abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris."
At common law, judges were immune from prosecution for offenses relating to their judicial duties." The justification for such immunity followed from the idea that the threat of personal liability
would inhibit judges in the exercise of their discretionary powers and
would deter capable individuals from seeking judicial posts.' In addition, the burden of continually defending lawsuits challenging past
decisions would keep judges from their primary judicial functions."
While the Supreme Court has accepted this common law doctrine of
judicial immunity,23 it has restrictively applied the doctrine to litiga24
tion under the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Act.
Although the text of § 1983 might be interpreted as extending
personal liability to all state judges and prosecutors,25 the Supreme
Court has extended judicial immunity to shield judges 2 from liability
for damages under § 1983.2 The Court, however, has left unresolved
19 Id.

" 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
" McCormack, Federalismand Section 1983: Limitation on JudicialEnforcement
of ConstitutionalProtections, PartI, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
McCormack].
2, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3
(4th Cir. 1972).
2 See McCormack, supra note 20, at 11 & n.62.
2 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). In Bradley, a federal judge
raised the defense of immunity in a suit brought by a lawyer who had been disbarred
by the judge. The Supreme Court sustained the immunity defense holding that, in the
absence of such a doctrine, the judge's office would be degraded and the judge would
be forced to preserve a complete record of his every decision for future defenses. Id. at
349.
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970).
2 See note 5 supra.
25 Prosecutors such as Solicitor Foard enjoy a quasi-judicial immunity for their
discretionary actions which form an integral part of the judicial process. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutor's actions of initiating prosecution and in
presenting the State's case immune from § 1983 damages suit). In the Timmerman
situation, where both Solicitor Foard and Magistrate. Brown were performing their
discretionary duties, quasi-judicial immunity of prosecutors equates to judicial immunity.
Y Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967). In Pierson, a municipal police
justice was extended judicial immunity for acts within his judicial responsibilities. The
judge convicted petitioner Ray, a civil rights activist, under a statute making it a
misdemeanor to congregate in public so as to cause a breach of the peace. Regardless
of the constitutionality of the statute, the judge enjoyed immunity for his actions under
the statute. Id. at 555.
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the question whether this judicial immunity extends to actions seeking only equitable or declaratory relief.3 The Fourth Circuit in considering this issue has recognized that to extend judicial immunity
to actions for equitable relief would render § 1983 meaningless for a
most important group of state officials . 29 The court of appeals, in the
absence of explicit Supreme Court guidance," has therefore held that
judicial immunity does not extend to actions seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief under § 1983. 1' This restriction of judicial immunity
to damage actions under the Civil Rights Acts balances the need for
state judicial autonomy with the federal interest in the protection of
32
civil rights.
The Timmerman court held that the district court upset this balance by extending the doctrine of judicial immunity to bar an action
for equitable and declaratory remedies under § 1983. The Fourth
Circuit, by preserving the availability of these equitable remedies,
participated in the present trend of increased concern with prison
administration and police and prosecutorial misconduct affecting
individual rights.3 3 Historically, federal courts were reluctant to interfere with the operation of state prisons. Federal courts exercised this
restraint because prison administration was considered a state prerogative34 and because prisoners were considered citizens who had
forfeited a substantial portion of their civil rights.3 5 However, the
21 See,

e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972).
The decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), has not been expanded by
the Supreme Court. See Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 1973); Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143 (1974).
But see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (§ 1983 actions seeking injunctive relief
against state judicial and law enforcement officials held to constitute an expressly
authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)).
3' See, e.g., Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1973). Fowler challenged
the constitutionality of North Carolina's statutes relating to the taxing of costs to
prosecution witnesses. His protest to those statutes led to a temporary incarceration
for nonpayment of court fees. Id. at 696. The Fourth Circuit, although denying injunctive relief for lack of proper standing, held that judicial immunity does not extend to
actions for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Id.
312 See McCormack, supra note 20, at 13-14.
3
E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964). See generally Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners'Grievances, 39 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 175 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarb & Singer].
31 Id. at 181-82.
E.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). See Note, JudicialIntervention
in PrisonAdministration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 178, 180-81 (1967); Note, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 516-20 (1963).
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Supreme Court's intervention, when prisoner constitutional rights
are abridged, 8 has encouraged increased federal judicial involvement
in previously ignored state prison administration.37 In Timmerman,
the Fourth Circuit maintained this effective § 1983 remedy against
state judicial officials who control so directly the constitutional rights
of prisoners.
Even though appellees Brown and Foard were denied judicial
immunity, they raised a second defense that federal court intervention in an on-going state judicial proceeding 38 was barred by the
Younger v. Harris31 abstention doctrine. The Fourth Circuit rejected
this defense, finding that the factual situation alleged in
Timmerman" fell within one of the exceptions to the Younger doctrine.4' Under the abstention doctrine, a federal court, in certain circumstances, abstains from the exercise of its validly pleaded jurisdiction.12 The foundation for abstention rests on a proper respect for
state court functions that afford a federal plaintiff a competent forum
in which to raise his claims. 3 There are four basic lines of cases which
have been variously recognized as justifying federal abstention:"
first, federal courts avoid deciding constitutional questions where the
case may be resolved in a state court on a question of state law;45
31E.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam); Cooper v. Pate, 378
U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam); Monroe v. Pape, 367 U.S. 196 (1961). See Note, Prisoners
Rights under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270, 1275 (1969).
3 E.g., Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
21The Fourth Circuit treated the state proceedings as ongoing since the criminal
indictments were issued and had only by error been nolle prossed. South Carolina
officials indicated that new indictments were to be prepared and presented to the
grand jury. 528 F.2d at 811. This characterization of the litigation as pending brought
the case within the strictures of Younger v. Harris,401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (principles of Younger v. Harrisapply where state criminal proceedings begin against federal plaintiffs after federal complaint filed); Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
See notes 7-14 supra.
528 F.2d at 814-15.
42 Maraist, FederalInjunctive Relief Against State CourtProceeding: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 535, 537 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Maraist].
13 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 123 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
" WRIGHT,

supra note 7, at

§

52. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAmo & H.

985-1009
(2d ed. 1973).
15The leading case supporting abstention to avert the unnecessary constitutional
interpretation problem is Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In
that case, the Court abstained from deciding a fourteenth amendment question that
might have resulted in an injunction of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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second, abstention may be invoked to avoid conflict with state administration of its own affairs;"6 third, in a less widely recognized
area, unsettled questions of state law may be deferred to state
courts;" and finally, in an area as yet unrecognized by the Supreme
Court, abstention may be invoked to serve the convenience of the
federal courts.
The Supreme Court, however, has declared one important instance when federal courts are not empowered to exercise the discretionary abstention doctrine. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,4 the Court
held that a district court's abstention awaiting state interpretation
of allegedly overbroad state statutes" was an inappropriate application of the doctrine.5' The Court justified federal injunctive relief
barring the threatened prosecution because of the "chilling effect" of
the overbroad statute on the plaintiffs exercise of his first amendment rights. 52 This restriction was substantially limited when the
Court, in Younger v. Harris,3 held that ongoing state criminal proseuntil a state court decided whether the Commission had the authority under state law
to make such an order. Importantly, this type abstention involves only postponement
of an exercise of valid federal jurisdiction while awaiting a state court determination.
See WmGHT, supra note 7,

§ 52

at 218-21.

,6E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
A?E.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)
(condemnation proceeding under unconstrued state statute stayed until state court
construed statute); United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964). But see Meredith v. Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943) (difficulties in ascertaining a municipality's power to issue bonds under statute
unconstrued by state courts are not sufficient grounds alone to justify abstention).
11E.g., Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949). But see Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S.
336 (1976) (dismissal because of crowded federal court docket held improper application of abstention doctrine).
" 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
" The statutes challenged in Dombrowski were the Louisiana Communist Control
Law, Acts of 1952, no. 506

§§

4-11 (current version at LA. REv. STAT. ANN.

§§

14:358-

65 (West 1974)), the Subversive Activities Law, Acts of 1954, no. 623 §§ 1-9 (current
version at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:366-73 (West 1974)), and the Communist Propaganda Control Law, LA. R.v. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:390-390.8 (West 1974).
5' 380 U.S. at 489.

, Id. at 487. In Dombrowski, the appellants offered proof that their private records
had been raided and that files and records were illegally seized. After a state court
quashed warrants issued on this illegally seized evidence, the prosecutor continued to
use this evidence in public hearings concerning the activities of the appellants. The
Court found that this continued state harassment sufficiently established a situation
where the appellants would be subject to irreparable harm if the state proceedings
continued. Id. at 485-86.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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cutions should not be enjoined, even under the Dombrowski holding,
except where extraordinary circumstances warranted intervention.5 '
Such extraordinary circumstances arise when a plaintiffs federally
protected rights are subject to "great and immediate" irreparable
injury other than the injury incurred by defending oneself in a single
lawsuit brought in good faith. 51 Sufficient irreparable injury may be
shown by evidence that the state prosecution was brought in "bad
faith" or for purposes of "harassment" or that "other unusual circumstances""5 exist which warrant federal equitable relief.57 In Younger,
the Court denied federal injunctive relief to the appellee, who was
being prosecuted under a state statute,58 because he had not shown
that he would suffer great and immediate injury in defending a prosecution based upon the application of a statute allegedly unconstitutional on its face.5 This proscriptive description of bad faith, harassment or other unusual circumstances was clarified by the Younger
Court when it upheld the Dombrowski decision."0 The Younger Court
stated that a breakdown of the state judicial system in Dombrowski
justified federal equitable intervention when a federal plaintiff would
suffer a substantial impairment of his first amendment rights while
awaiting state adjudication."' Supreme Court decisions subsequent to
Younger have reiterated the extreme reluctance of federal courts to
interfere with state criminal prosecutions. 2 The Supreme Court has
11Id. at 43.

5s Id. at 46, citing Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926). See Cousins v. Wigoda,
409 U.S. 1201 (1972).
51Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975) defined these unusual circumstances as
not encompassing merely unusual factual situations but rather those situations which
create an extraordinary pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief. Id. at 12425.
'1 401 U.S. at 54. One issue not addressed in Younger, yet important to the analysis of Timmerman, involved the effect of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1970), on the federal judiciary's power to issue injunctions in pending state proceedings. This issue was resolved when the Supreme Court later held that § 1983 falls
within the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972). See note 30 supra.
The state statute involved in the controversy was the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (1970).
s'401 U.S. at 54.

Id. at 47-49.
Id. at 48-49.
' See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S.
"

592, 610 (1975); Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1206 (1972). See generally Zeigler,
An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to
Enforce ConstitutionalSafeguards in the State CriminalProcess, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
266 (1976).
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determined that federal courts must survey the full range of circumstances surrounding state prosecutions when deciding whether a federal plaintiff has met the severe burden of proving manifest bad
faith"3 and injury which is "great, immediate and irreparable." 4
Timmerman identifies one set of factual circumstances constituting a case of bad faith and harassment sufficient to remove state
criminal proceeding from the protection afforded by the Younger abstention doctrine. The Fourth Circuit found that three elements combined to constitute sufficient cause for federal judicial intervention:
the double indictment of appellees Timmerman and Thomas; Magistrate Brown's finding that probable cause existed to indict the correctional officials who participated in the beating of Timmerman; and
Solicitor Foard's illegal attempts to suppress the prosecution of those
officials." The court emphasized that an indictment, dismissal and
re-indictment on substantially identical charges did not alone give
rise to an inference of prosecution without reasonable expectation of
conviction. 6 However, when these factual circumstances combine
with a finding by a competent judicial official that probable cause
existed to prosecute the antagonists of the original defendants, the
court held that it could justifiably infer that a substantial doubt
existed as to the good faith prospects for a conviction against those
persons allegedly attacked. This inference gained support from the
fact that Solicitor Foard resorted to illegal measures to suppress the
criminal warrants issued against the state officials. 8
Timmerman represents an accomodation of competing state and
federal interests in applying the abstention doctrine. 9 The state has
a proprietary interest in prison administration and security which
dictates a substantial measure of autonomy." The federal interest is
in the protection of prisoners' constitutional rights such as free
'3 Bad faith means that a prosecution has been brought "without a reasonable
expectation of obtaining'a valid conviction." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6
(1975). See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971).
" Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 836 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting). See note 62 supra.
'5

528 F.2d at 815.
IId.

'7

Id.

Id. See text accompanying note 12 supra. The subjective intent of Solicitor
Foard is relevant to the Younger bad faith determination in Timmerman. See Carey,
Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Prosecutions, 56 MASs. L.Q. 11, 20
(1971).
" Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 56 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
" See generally Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 33, at 181-83.
"
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speech, equal protection, and due process of law.7 1 In Timmerman,
where state officials were directly threatening constitutional rights
under the guise of state criminal action that did not further prison
security, federal abstention to avoid conflict with state administration of its own affairs lost importance.7 2 Further, federal intervention
would be effective with only a small intrusion upon the state domain.
Relief could be framed narrowly against minor prison officials requiring minimal infringement on the legitimate concern of the state controlling the actions of its officials 7.3 The granting of federal injunctive
relief in Timmerman places this case among those rare exceptions to
the Younger doctrine;7 4 factual situations that can meet the bad faith
and harassment test have aptly been described as falling within the
"bearded, one-eyed, red-haired man with a limp" category. 5 In
Timmerman, the Fourth Circuit remained within the Younger strictures by not expanding the grounds for federal intervention in ongoing state litigation.
JON

P. LECKERLING

C. Standing to Sue: Plaintiffs as Taxpayers, Citizens and
Congressmen
Standing to sue is a judicially-imposed limitation upon the
jurisdiction of federal courts that is derived from the "case and controversy" restrictions of article III of the Constitution.' Inherent
U.S. CONST. AMEND. I, XIV.
" See text accompanying note 46 supra;Maraist, FederalIntervention in State
CriminalProceedings:Dombrowski, Younger and Beyond, 50 TEXAs L. REv.1324, 1346
(1972).
13 Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski,
Younger and Beyond, 50 TEXAS L. Rav. 1324, 1340 (1972).
"1Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42-45 (1971).
, Maraist, supra note 42, at 536.

U.S. CONSr. art. 19, § 2, states that judicial power is limited to cases and
controversies. Standing, along with ripeness, mootness, collusive suits and political
questions comprise the constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction known as
justiciability. Hennigan, The Essence of Standing: The Basis of a ConstitutionalRight
to be Heard, 10 Amz. L. Ray. 438, 438 (1968). The earliest consideration of jurisdictional limitations in relation to the "case and controversy" clause occurred in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), where the court determined that it could
exercise review only within the framework of a lawsuit with parties presenting adverse
interests in which they were seeking favorable decision. For a discussion of standing,
see Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 601 (1968) [hereinafter
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within the doctrine of standing is the issue of a federal court's right
to deny jurisdiction to citizen and taxpayer actions brought against
the government. 2 Recently the Fourth Circuit considered Harrington
v. Schlesinger,' where the court of appeals denied plaintiffs standing
to challenge the executive spending of funds for the support of military operations in Southeast Asia.'
In Harrington, the plaintiffs sought standing as taxpayers, citizens, and congressmen, alleging that the federal government, by
spending money to support activities in Southeast Asia, 5 had violated7
8
two appropriations acts and article 1, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution.
cited as Davis]; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 255 (1961); Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17
N.Y.L.F. 911 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tucker].
2 The leading authority for the proposition that a person asserting only his status
as a taxpayer lacks standing to bring suit against the government is Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The Court in Frothingham held that a taxpayer had no
standing to sue a government official where the taxpayer had suffered no direct injury
as a result of the expenditures of which she complained. Id. at 488. For an analysis of
Frothingham see Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
3 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975).
1 Harringtonwas one of a number of cases which were brought in reaction to
United States military involvement in Southeast Asia. Other cases included: Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Mitchell v. Laird,
488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Velvel.v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
1 528 F.2d at 456. These activities were specified as the support of foreign mercenaries, the continued attachment of American military advisors to combat units, providing American planes for reconnaissance missions in support of bombing, and the
conduct of clandestine activities. Id.
' The two Acts were part of the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973,
which prohibited the spending of funds to support United States combat forces in
Southeast Asia after August 15, 1973. Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 129 (1973)
provides:
None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over
Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam... by United
States forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore
appropriated under any other Act may be expended for such
purpose[s].
Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 134 (1973) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15,
1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or
expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United
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Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought to end shipments of
ordnance, stop the use of United States forces in Southeast Asia, and
halt government spending on alleged "prohibited activities." 8 The
district court granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
case involved an unjusticiable political question On appeal the
Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to sue. In reaching its decision, the court considered but rejected
plaintiffs' arguments concerning their asserted standing as taxpayers,
citizens and congressmen.
The Harringtoncourt applied the two-prong nexus test first established in Flast v. Cohen" and concluded that the plaintiffs as taxpayers failed to present a constitutional challenge to congressional
appropriations. In Flast, the plaintiffs asserted their status as taxpayers and alleged that federal funds disbursed by federal officials
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196511 for use
in religious schools violated the "establishment" and "free exercise"
clauses 2 of the first amendment. 3 Recognizing that some confusion
had grown out of previous cases," the Court decided to reexamine the
standing doctrine in relation to taxpayer suits. The Court set up a
two-part nexus test whereby individuals were required to demonstrate their stake as taxpayers in the outcome of litigation in which
they were challenging the constitutionality of a fedbral spending program. The first part of the test required a determination of "whether
there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated."' 5 The plaintiffs in Flast met this requirement because they directly challenged the spending and taxing power
States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.
7 U.S. COsT. art. I, §9, cl. 7 provides: "No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law. .. ."
528 F.2d at 456. These activities were prohibited by the appropriations acts. See
note 6 supra.
Harrington v. Schlesinger, 373 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
10392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Flast, the plaintiffs had standing. Their complaint was
consistent with the case and controversy limitation because of assertions that tax
money was being spent in violation of a specific clause of the Constitution. Id. at 103.
" 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a et. seq., 821 et. seq. (1970).
"

U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
392 U.S. at 85.

" The Court specifically referred to Frothingham,392 U.S.at 94. See note 2 supra.
The Frothingham decision had the practical effect of removing the spending power
from the scope of judicial review and it tended to place a broad ban on suits by federal
taxpayers challenging appropriations. C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 44 (3d ed.

1976).
"1

392 U.S. at 102.
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of Congress."6 The second part of the test required an allegation that
the challenged federal appropriations statute exceeded specific constitutional limitations on the taxing and spending power of Congress.
The plaintiffs in Flast met this requirement by asserting that the
establishment clause 7 created a limitation upon congressional taxing
and spending power."
The Harrington court utilized the requirements of Flast holding
that the plaintiff taxpayers failed to present a constitutional challenge to a congressional appropriation. Although the plaintiffs
claimed that there were constitutional limitations upon executive
expenditures, the Fourth Circuit saw no real controversy concerning
the application of such expenditures, but interpreted the issue as one
involving different views of the appropriations acts." The court's interpretation was supplemented by its recognition of the possibility of
an executive making a "clear and flagrant" violation of congressional
limitations upon expenditures. In such a situation, judicial intervention would be appropriate." In Harrington,the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the plaintiffs sought only judicial interpretation
of the statutes, they failed to present an issue of constitutionality.2
Through this analysis of the issues in Harrington,the court refused
to find a cause of action by taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of executive expenditures.23
" Id. at 102-03. Plaintiffs' challenge in Flast met this test because they questioned
the exercise of congressional power under Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. Id.
392 U.S. at 103.
" Id. at 105-06. Problems resulting from the two part nexus test of Flast became
readily apparent because "it is arguable that all constitutional prescriptions are intended for the protection of that class of citizens which is at any one time disadvantaged by the failure to observe the constitutional requirement." Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in PublicActions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1033, 1045 (1968); Note, Federal Standing: 1976, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 383, 390
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Federal Standing].
528 F.2d at 457.
Id. at 458.
"1Id. The court stated, however, that Harringtondid not present a situation in
which there was a clear and flagrant violation of congressional limitations. Id.
11The Fourth Circuit in Harringtoncompared its conclusion of a lack of an issue
concerning constitutionality with Reservists. See text accompanying notes 32-34 infra.

While the effort in .

.

. [Reservists] to compel attempts to recover

payments to reservists while members of Congress presented the question of the status of reservists as officers of the United States within
the meaning of the Incompatibility Clause, in this case [Harrington]
there is simply no issue involving the application and interpretation
of any constitutional provision.
528 F.2d at 458.
' 528 F.2d at 458.
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The factual distinctions between Harringtonand Flast, however,
should have led the Fourth Circuit to view the facts apart from the
Flast test in reaching its decision. In Flast, the plaintiffs sought to
challenge the constitutionality of congressional appropriations. In
contrast, the Harringtonplaintiffs did not question Congress's power
to make such appropriations, but sought to require executive spending to comport with those appropriations."
In an effort to limit taxpayer standing, the Fourth Circuit in
Harringtonfollowed the current trend to give the Flast decision a
strict reading.2 Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to allege other possible
grounds for establishing standing. 6 The reasons for Harrington'srestriction of taxpayer standing are not persuasive in the face of a
factual situation that involved a tangible injury to taxpayers if
allegations of wrongdoing proved accurate. By applying the limitations of the Flast test, courts have assumed that they would be considering only those cases capable of judicial review in a truly adversary context, thereby preventing the crowding of dockets with cases
where plaintiffs pursue generalized grievances concerning government fiscal policy-.2 .
In support of its holding that the plaintiffs failed to claim a real
constitutional controversy, the Harrington court compared its approach to that of the Supreme Court in United States v. Richardson.2
2, In Flast and Harrington, the plaintiffs brought actions as taxpayers alleging
injuries to themselves resulting from unauthorized expenditures. Although the type of
expenditures in the two cases differed, the plaintiffs' relationship to those expenditures
(that of taxpayers) was the same.
2 Three recent Supreme Court cases establishing rigid criteria for standing have
led to restrictive interpretations of the doctrine. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See Federal Standing, supra note 18, at 383.
2, The nexus test established in Flastis but one method of ascertaining the extent
of a taxpayer's particular injury. See generally Davis, supra note 1, at 604-08. Other
grounds upon which plaintiffs have successfully attained standing include: abstract
interests: Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922); Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), widespread injury: United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
" See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1318-19 (1973); Hallman v. Phillips, 409 F. Supp. 423, 426 (E.D.Pa. 1976); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Counsel,
407 F. Supp. 257, 258 (D.D.C. 1976).
2x 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, a federal taxpayer was denied standing to
bring suit for the purpose of declaring unconstitutional that portion of the CIA Act,
50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (1970), which holds the agency accountable for its expenditures
solely on the certificate of the Director. The plaintiff intended to use this declaration
to obtain information concerning CIA funding, so that he might contest those
appropriations. In denying the plaintiff standing, the Court found this to be a generalized grievance with no logical nexus between the plaintiff's station as a taxpayer and
the asserted failure of Congress to require detailed expenditure reports. 418 U.S. at 175.
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Richardsonstrictly applied the Flasttest to bar judicial review of the
constitutionality of the statute outlining CIA funding procedures.
The link between taxpayer status and the need for information concerning spending was tenuous at best, since there was no clear nexus
established that caused a direct injury to the taxpayer." The
Richardson court appeared to confine taxpayer challenges to acts of
Congress specifically limited by the taxing and spending clause." The
issue presented by Harrington,however, was different. In Harrington,
the challenge was to the interpretation of a statute, not its basic
constitutionality. Because the Fourth Circuit approached Harrington
in the same manner as the Supreme Court approached Richardson
it failed to recognize these differences and the import of an injury
suffered by the Executive's alleged failure to comply with the statutes."
In denying standing to the Harringtontaxpayers, the Fourth Circuit also relied upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of Flast in
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War.3 In Reservists,
the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of United States citizens and taxpayers, challenging congressmen's membership in the
military reserves." Although the Reservists claim for taxpayer standing was stronger than the Harrington claim, standing was denied.
The Fourth Circuit believed that the plaintiffs in Reservists had a
stronger claim because that case concerned the issue of the status of
reservists as congressmen within the meaning of the incompatibility
clause,"' while Harrington did not involve the interpretation of any
constitutional provision.35
" 418 U.S. at 175. In Richardson, the plaintiff failed to allege that he was "in
danger of suffering any particular concrete injury ... ." 418 U.S. at 177. The Court
found that the asserted injury, which was in fact shared by all citizens, was merely a
"generalized grievance." Id. at 176.
31 See Note, The Continued Vitality of the Standing Doctrine In Challenges to
Federal Government Action, 24 CATm. U.L. REv. 328, 337 (1975).
31See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
32 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
' In Reservists, the Supreme Court found that the respondent association of
present and former members of the armed forces lacked standing as taxpayers to
challenge the reserve officer status of members of Congress, allegedly in violation of
the incompatibility clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. The logical
nexus between taxpayer status and the specific limitation on congressional spending
power had not been established. A concrete injury must be shown, which "adds the
essential dimension of specificity.
by requiring that the complaining party have
suffered a particular injury. . .

."

418 U.S. at 221.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
528 F.2d at 458. The Fourth Circuit qualified its differentiation of Reservists by
stating that in Harrington,"[a]ll that is sought is judicial interpretation of the stat-
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In considering the plaintiffs' claim of standing as citizens interested in enforcing the Constitution, the Harringtoncourt readily disposed of the claim by citing to the holding of Reservists, which held
any undifferentiated interest or speculative injury insufficient to
meet the "case and controversy" requirement of the Constitution. 6
The Richardson decision also reached the same conclusion on the
plaintiff's allegation that he needed the CIA funding information to
perform his obligations as a voter.3 7 A concerned citizen may not
bring a suit in support of his general interest in the lawful conduct
of the federal government if he suffers no sufficiently direct injury.n
Reservists and Richardson reflect the position that a citizen's general
complaints concerning the conduct of the federal government should
not be heard by the judiciary. Instead, such matters are more capably
resolved in democratic forums where citizens can air their grievances
and prevent excesses by elected representatives through withdrawal
of support.3 9 The judicial forum should be used sparingly to preserve
the rights of individuals and minorities rather than to protect citizens
at large from the excesses of their legislators."
utes, as applied, and injunctive relief should that interpretation go in the plaintiffs'
favor." Id.
U.S. CONST. art HI, § 2. 528 F.2d at 458-59. The Supreme Court distinguished
its holding in Reservists concerning citizen standing from Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and United States v.

SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) by stating,
[i]t
is one thing for a court to hear an individual's complaint that
certain specific government action will cause that person private competitive injury.., or a complaint that individual enjoyment of certain
natural resources has been imparied by such action... but it is another matter to allow a citizen to call on the courts to resolve abstract
questions.
418 U.S. at 223.
11United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 (1974). In this determination the
Court relied heavily upon Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), in which a citizen
challenged the appointment of Justice Black to the Supreme Court. The Court in
Levitt held that the citizen-petitioner had only a "general interest" in the action,
because he failed to show that he had "sustained or [was] immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury. . . ." Id. at 634.
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Ex parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
"' C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
§ 3531, at 225 (1975).
0 Id. See Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-PrayerCases, 1963
Sup. CT. REv. 1. Concerning the limitations upon judicial power, Professor Brown
stated, "[o]ur bargain is that the Court should have power, but will use it sparingly;
the restriction is integral to the bargain." Id. at 3-4.
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The Harringtoncourt also considered the issue of a congressman's
standing to sue in light of the stringent standards applied by other
federal courts.4 The court relied upon the Second Circuit case of
Holtzman v. Schlesinger," where the plaintiff-congresswoman alleged denial of her right to vote on the issues of bombing and other
military activities in Cambodia. In Holtzman, the court stated that
the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the legality of bombing in Cambodia, when in fact she had not been denied the right to
vote on the issue. 3 The Fourth Circuit in Harringtonconcluded that
once proposed legislation has become law, a congressman's interest
is the same generalized interest as that of any citizen, and thus is
insufficient to invoke standing to challenge governmental action.44
This position seems to reflect the viewpoint that while legislators may
represent their constituents in the legislature, they are not better
suited to represent them in the courts than are the citizens themselves.
In its denial of standing to the plaintiffs in Harrington,the Fourth
Circuit was not wholly successful in its application of existing case
law.45 Preoccupation with applying the Flast test resulted in the
court's failure to recognize substantive differences between the plaintiffs' causes of action. Harringtonreflects the necessity for a more
relaxed view of standing so that courts may initially review the merits
of the case to determine the issues and injuries involved before applying a pre-existing standing formula.
DAvID H.

ALDRICH

'3 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974); Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972).
42 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). In Holtzman, standing was denied due to the

political question limitation of justiciability. Specifically, the court stated that it was
in no position to decide the status of Cambodian insurgents in relation to North
Vietnamese Communists. The court concluded that "[w]hile we as men may well
agonize and bewail the horror of this or any war, the sharing of Presidential and
Congressional responsibility particularly at this juncture is a bluntly political and not
a judicial question." Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1315.
528 F.2d at 459.
In a fact situation not lending itself to the requirements of the Flast test, the
Fourth Circuit combined its application of those requirements with the Supreme
Court's subsequent interpretations of Flast in Richardson and Reservists. The result
is a confusing combination of case law that does not apply to the claims for relief in
Harrington. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.

